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A QUESTION OF MATERIALITY: WHY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S REGULATION FAIR
DISCLOSURE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
INTRODUCrION

The tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of
uncertainty, so that citizens may know by what standards their conduct
will be judged.'
By now it is a familiar story.2 An employee at Kent Electronics
inadvertently sent an email to certain Wall Street analysts revealing
that the company had closed on the sale of its least profitable business
division.3 The email, the first such disclosure Kent had made about
the transaction, came less than two hours into the day's trading and
before the company had intended to make public the announcement
4
of the sale at the close of the day's trading.
Upon learning of the mistake, company officials reacted quickly,
sending a subsequent communication informing the recipients that
the previous email was being recalled, 5 contacting the New York Stock
Exchange to stop trading of its stock, making public the same information through news wires, emails and faxes, and accelerating the time of
the scheduled conference call with analysts. 6 By day's end, the potential damage of the inadvertent disclosure had been averted and company officials, by all accounts, had done an excellentjob in correcting
what could have been a costly mistake. 7 Indeed, the incident at Kent
Electronics can be seen as an example of how a company should react
under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recently
adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) 8 when confronted with an
unintentional disclosure of material information by one of its officers
or employees.
1. John Fedders, QualitativeMateriality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard,48 GATH. U. L. REv. 41, 87 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Robert McGough, E-Mail Snafu Shows 'Selective Disclosure'Pitfalls,WALL
ST.J., Oct. 11, 2000, at C1.
3. Id.
4. Id.

5.

Id

6.

Id.

7.

See id.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2002).

8.
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What if, however, things had turned out differently? What could
have happened that might have led to a different ending? Consider
the following possible scenarios:
SCENARIO 1: The employee at Kent inadvertently sends the email,
yet the company, having failed to recognize the error, does not make
prompt public disclosure and instead continues in accordance with its
plan to release the information as scheduled.
SCENARIO 2: Kent recognizes its mistake yet does not consider the
information to be significant and does not make prompt public disclosure. Instead, the company only sends the recall email to those analysts who received the information.
SCENARIO 3: Kent recognizes its mistake and acts to contain the
damage only after its share price has been affected, yet still within the
24-hour period allowed under Regulation FD. 9
The preceding scenarios raise numerous questions with regard to
issuer liability under Regulation FD. Under which scenario will the
SEC bring enforcement proceedings against Kent? Will the SEC act
independently to enforce the regulation even where neither party to
the disclosure deemed the information material and the recipients did
not act upon the information? Similarly, will the various parties' determination of liability diverge on the key issue of the materiality of the
information?1

In light of these scenarios, this paper will address the following
question: is the standard of materiality under Regulation FD adequate
to provide the corporate issuer with fair notice of liability? Regulation
FD imposes liability for the selective disclosure of "material nonpublic
information" without a simultaneous or prompt public disclosure of
the same information.1 1 The SEC, however, has not specifically defined what "material" information is within the meaning of the regulation. 12 Rather, it has incorporated the same general standard of
9. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (d) (2002). For a complete explanation of the elements of
Regulation FD, see infra Part I.
10. The answers to these questions may be coming sooner than anticipated. The
SEC has already investigated a number of companies for possible violations of Regulation FD. Harvey Pitt, current Chairman of the SEC, said that it is "likely there will be a
case in the FD area sooner rather than later." Neil Roland, SEC PlansAction on Disclosure
Directive, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 25, 2001, at 3D.
11.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2002). See also infra Part I.
12. The SEC states: "The Regulation does not define the term 'material,' but instead relies on the same definition as is generally applicable under the federal securities
laws." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC-Release No. 33-7787, 64 Fed. Reg.
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materiality as developed under the federal securities laws. 13 The understanding of what precisely constitutes "material" information under
these laws has long been the subject of much dispute within the legal
and financial communities. 14 Yet in any proceeding brought under
Regulation FD, enforcement will turn almost exclusively on the determination of whether or not the information was material.' 5 Who will
make this determination and on what standard?
This paper will argue that Regulation FD is unconstitutionally
vague 16 because it is based upon an unworkable standard of materiality
that fails to provide the issuer with fair notice of liability. Under Regulation FD, liability will rest upon an objective and often hypothetical
determination of the materiality of the information released, in light
of the issuer's failure to make public disclosure within the regulation's
specified time frame. 17 Current competing standards of materiality,
72,590, 72,594 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (hereinafter "Proposed Rule"). See also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC-Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103).
13. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC-Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103). See also
Proposed Rule at 72,594. The standard of materiality for purposes of Regulation FD is
that which was defined in TSC Industries, Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
This standard of materiality is discussed in-depth, infra Part II.C.
14. Indeed, the SEC itself has admitted that "materiality judgments can be difficult" and that "materiality issues do not lend themselves to a bright-line test." Proposed
Rule at 72,594-95. The American Bar Association's Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities, in its comment letter on proposed Regulation FD,stated: "A significant
concern regarding Regulation FD centers on its reliance on materiality. This is one of
the most amorphous concepts in the securities laws." Comment Letter Regarding Selective Disclosure, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Business Law Section of
the American Bar Association (May 8, 2000) at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/ proposed/
s73199/keller2.htm. See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), for an indepth discussion of the various factors affecting materiality judgments.
15. The selective disclosure of information that is clearly not material will not give
rise to liability under the Regulation. As discussed infra, Parts II and III, the materiality
element will be the most contentious and difficult to enforce. See Commissioner Laura
S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, (Dec. 2001) at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/ regfdstudy.htm. ("[L]iability under Reg FD hinges on the
element of materiality.").
16. For a detailed explanation of the void for vagueness doctrine, see Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See also infta Part III.
17. Since Regulation FD imposes liability for the mere disclosure of material nonpublic information, as opposed to the actual use of such information, proving that the
information was material in fact will, in most cases, be centered upon the hypothesis of
its potential or apparent utility. See infra Part III.B.2.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

however, will be inadequate to make such a determination. 18 As a result, the issuer will have little recourse to determine how information
will be deemed material for enforcement purposes. 19 This lack of fair
notice will lead to selective enforcement by the SEC with little or no
degree of predictability. 20 Regulation FD will ultimately fail short of its
goal of promoting fair disclosure practices. Indeed, it will have the
opposite effect of obstructing the flow of material information from
21
the corporation to the securities markets.
Part I of this paper will begin with a description of the elements of
liability under Regulation FD and, in particular, the requirement of
materiality. Part II will then discuss the varying standards of materiality
that have developed in the field of securities law. Quantitative and
qualitative approaches to measuring materiality as well as judicial doctrine under federal securities laws will be compared and contrasted in
light of their utility in establishing liability under Regulation FD. Part
III will briefly highlight the recent history and analytical framework of
the void for vagueness doctrine. The doctrine will then be applied to
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, in her report, Special Study: Regulation Fair
Disclosure Revisited, summarized what some issuers expressed at the SEC Roundtable on
Regulation FD, convened in April 2001: "A number of issuers expressed uncertainty
about how to apply the materiality standard under the Reg FD regime. They also stated
that fear of Commission enforcement action had exacerbated their uncertainty." Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: RegulationFairDisclosureRevisited, (Dec. 2001) at
http://wvw.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm. "Commenters worried that a general materiality standard would require issuer personnel to make real-time or after-thefact materiality determinations that could be second-guessed by the SEC." Id.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. This was a common concern of many critics of proposed Regulation FD during the SEC's comment period. Commissioner Unger reported that while at this early
stage of the regulation's history "most of the evidence about [Regulation] FD's impact
is anecdotal rather than empirical," many issuers present at the Roundtable "agreed
that uncertainty about materiality under [Regulation] FD caused them to err on the
side of caution." Moreover, some analysts "believed that issuers use [Regulation] FD as
a shield, refusing to disclose virtually any information." Commissioner Laura S. Unger,
Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, (Dec. 2001) at http://wv.sec.gov/
news/studies/regfdstudy.htm. Commissioner Unger cited a number of surveys conducted to gauge the impact of Regulation FD on the quantity and quality of market
information released during the period the regulation has been in effect. In particular,
the latest survey by the Association for Investment Management and Research, dated
October 18, 2001, reveals that, of those surveyed, 51% believed that issuers are disclosing less substantive information. See id. See also Cheryl Munk, SEC Disclosure Rule Dims
Appeal of Conferences, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at C16; Mitchell Zacks, Full Disclosure
May Hurt the Overall Marketplace, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL
6689897.
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Regulation FD, revealing why the regulation fails to adequately provide
fair notice to issuers of what constitutes material information with respect to the practice of selective disclosure. Part III will conclude that
Regulation FD, in its current form, is unconstitutionally vague, and
therefore must be modified or rescinded by the SEC.
I.

REGULATION FAIR DIscLosuRE

One of the unifying goals underlying much of the federal securities disclosure laws is the regulation of the methods of disseminating
information in order to ensure open, honest, and fair access to all potentially significant financial information. 2 2 Consistent with this goal,
the SEC proposed Regulation FD as a means of proscribing the practice of selective disclosure of financial information by corporations to
relatively few analysts and institutional and individual investors. 23 It is
the view of the SEC that selective disclosure is damaging to overall investor confidence in the securities markets because it provides a select
few with unfair access to potentially "market-moving"24 information. 25
This "informational advantage," 26 according to the SEC, "has the immediate effect of enabling those privy to the information to make a
quick profit (or quickly minimize losses) by trading before the information is disseminated to the public."2 7 This practice may ultimately
compromise both the overall quality of financial data made publicly
available and the objectiveness of some analysts' research. 28 Thus, by
prohibiting selective disclosure, the SEC believes that Regulation FD
will ensure fairness and integrity in the systematic public disclosure of
any financial information that may have an impact upon the securities
markets.

29

22. See Proposed Rule at 72,591. See also In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 1971 WL
120502, at *5, 44 SEC 633 (1971) ("The maintenance of fair and honest markets in
securities and the prevention of inequitable and unfair practices in such markets are
the primary objectives of the federal securities laws.").
23. See Proposed Rule at 72,591.
24. Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of TairDisclosure' Rule, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Cl.
25. See id. See also Proposed Rule at 72,590-92.
26. Proposed Rule at 72,592.
27. Id.
28. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC-Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716-17 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103).
29. See id. at 51,717-18.
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Regulation FD, promulgated under §13(a) and §15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), applies to all issuers with securities registered under §12 of the Exchange Act.30 The
regulation provides that a corporate issuer, or any person authorized
to act on' its behalf, which intentionally discloses "material nonpublic
information" to certain persons outside of the corporation must "simultaneously" make public disclosure of the same information. 3' If
the disclosure is non-intentional, then the issuer must "promptly"
make public disclosure of the same information.3 2 The SEC may institute administrative or civil actions, including cease and desist orders
and injunctions, or assess monetary penalties against issuers, or individuals acting on their behalf, that fail to comply. 33 According to the
SEC, Regulation FD is "an issuer disclosure rule" and is not intended
as an antifraud regulation (thus there is no private right of action
under the rule).34 Regulation FD does not require that corporations
make public all material developments as they occur, only that when
they "choose to disclose material nonpublic information, [they] must
35
do so broadly to the investing public, not selectively to a favored few."
What follows is a brief assessment of the various approaches to
determining the materiality of financial information and how they may
be used by both (1) issuers in understanding their potential liability
under Regulation FD and (2) the SEC in proving the "materiality" element of liability under Regulation FD.

30. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2002). For purposes of the rule, an "issuer" is one
that "has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the [Exchange Act], or is
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the [Exchange Act], including any
closed-end investment company." The rule does not include in its definition "any other
investment company or any foreign government or foreign private issuer." Id.
17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a) (1), 243.101(b) (2002). Regulation FD prohibits selec31.
tive disclosure to brokers, dealers, investment advisers, institutional investment managers, any persons "associated" with the previously mentioned, investment companies, and
persons "affiliated" with investment companies, or any "holder" of the issuer's securities. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i-iv).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2) (2002).
33. See Proposed Rule at 72,598.
34. See id. at 72,591. See also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEG-Release
No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716-17 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100243.103).
35. Proposed Rule at 72,594.
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I[.

UNDERSTANDING MATERIALITY

A starting point for any discussion of materiality is the recognition
that "materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and
fact; involving [the] application of a legal standard to a particular set
of facts." 36 Clearly significant information is considered material as a
matter of law. 37 However, more frequently, the question of materiality
"is not always susceptible to a ready answer."38 Indeed, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has stated that "materialityjudgements can properly be made only by those who have all the facts, [yet]
no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into
account all the considerations that enter into an experienced human
39
judgement.
It is in this realm of factual ambiguity that the corporate issuer will
run into trouble in attempting to comply with the materiality requirement of Regnlation FD. In the court room, "the question of whether a
fact is material . . .must be resolved by the trier of fact."40 In the

conference room, the question of whether a fact is material must be
resolved by the officer of the corporation, often in the moment in
which he or she is speaking. 41 In the court room, the question will be
resolved with the benefit of hindsight (was the information actually
traded on? what was the context of the conversation? why was that
36. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
37. See id.
38. Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship ofMateriality and Recklessness in Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 55 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1026 (2000).
39. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150-51 (Aug. 19, 1999)
(quoting FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 131 (1980)).
40. Honvich, supra note 38, at 1026.
41. The SEC recognized this problem when discussing the regulation's potential
impact upon corporate disclosure practices. See Proposed Rule at 72,594. This was also
a common concern of many critics of proposed Regulation FD during the SEC's comment period. For example: " [A] question and answer session during a conference call
may give a corporate official only seconds to make a materialityjudgment. In this environment, it is highly impractical to consult with counsel regarding whether the information being revealed is material. Counsel would essentially have to be constantly
available to ensure that investor relations officials do not inadvertently reveal material,
nonpublic information, a highly impractical and prohibitively expensive solution." The
ironic affect of this solution would be that the consultation "might itself attach undue
significance to the answer, causing listeners to draw misleading conclusions, resulting in
greater instability and misinformation in the marketplace." Comment Letter Regarding Selective Disclosure, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Business Law
Section of the American Bar Association (May 8, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/
proposed/s73199/keller2.htm.
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specific information sought?). In the conference room, the question
must be resolved with the burden of limited foresight, balancing both
the "probability" that the information disclosed will have any singular
or aggregate effect on the market with the potential "magnitude" of
that effect. 4 2 Since "the law provides no bright line between what corporate executives can and cannot say,"'43 how will the corporate officer
make this determination? Must the officer assume the role of trier of
fact every time he or she seeks to comply with the obligations of Regulation FD? Must lawyers and accountants assess the significance of
every corporate communication? If so, on what standard or upon what
guidelines will they rely in assessing the materiality of any given piece
44
of information?
A.

QuantitativeMateriality

Perhaps the most widespread approach to determining materiality, developed under industry accounting standards, measures the
quantitative impact of a piece of information upon the company's financial statement. 45 That is, a quantitative approach to materiality attempts to assess the significance of a misstated fact in a financial
disclosure by measuring the degree to which that fact affects the statement of the company's overall financial performance 46 and thus, its
share value. More specifically, quantitative materiality is an objective,
accounting-based assessment of the potential impact of a disclosed fact
on various financial "benchmarks" of company performance such as
42. Horwich, supra note 38, at 1025 (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988)). The probability-magnitude balancing test of materiality was initially posited in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
43. Peter H. Ehrenberg and Peter S. Friedman, To Speak or Not to Speak: Selective
Disclosureand Regulation FD, 203 N.J. LAw. 23, 24 (June 2000).
44. In its Adopting Release, the SEC did provide a limited, non-exhaustive list of
some types of information or events that should be viewed carefully to determine
whether they are material." These include earnings information, mergers, acquisitions,
tender offers, joint ventures, or asset changes, new products or discoveries, new customer or supplier developments, changes in management, changes in auditors, information concerning the issuer's securities, and bankruptcies or similar events. Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC-Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721
(Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103). However, it explicitly declined to adopt a rigid, bright-line test of materiality. Id.
45. Quantitative materiality is discussed extensively in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150-51 (Aug. 19, 1999).
46. See id. at 45,151.
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"revenues, gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, stockhold47
ers' equity, or individual line items in the financial statements."
In a quantitative assessment, the impact of a particular misstated
fact will be measured against a "percentage threshold" 48 set by the corporation and auditors in order to determine whether the fact is material. The quantifiable effect of a misstated fact that falls below this
percentage threshold, in terms of its effect on the relevant financial
benchmarks of company performance, is not likely to be considered
material. 49 The general "rule of thumb" utilized by the accounting industry is that a "misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a
5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly egregious
circumstances such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior
management."5 0
The SEC, however, has not completely embraced the quantitative
approach as the exclusive standard upon which determinations of materiality should be based. Indeed, the SEC, stating that "assessments of
materiality should never be purely mechanical," 51 has highlighted numerous limitations inherent in such an approach. The question at the
heart of the SEC's reluctance to embrace a quantitative approach as
the guiding standard is whether an assessment of the materiality of a
given fact can be based exclusively on "anticipating the market's reaction to accounting information" 52 or whether such an assessment "is by
itself 'too blunt an instrument to be depended on'"sa in making such a
determination. This difficulty in devising simplified yet accurate standards for assessing the materiality of information based upon potential
market reaction is a concern shared by the FASB. 54 A related concern
of both the SEC and the FASB in this regard is "the degree of precision
that is attainable in estimating"5 5 the materiality of a given piece of
information. Is it always possible to accurately anticipate the effect of
information on the market? Who can make such an assessment, and
how will uniform standards be formulated to guide decision-making as
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 45,153 n. 24.
Id. at 45,151.
See id.

50.

Id.

51. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,153 n. 24 (Aug.
19, 1999).
52. Id. at 45,152.

53.

Id. at 45,152 (quoting FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 169 (1980)).

54.
55.

See id.
Id. at 45,152 n.14.
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to what will or will not be material under Regulation FD? Will accountants and lawyers shadow corporate officers at every turn in order to
insure compliance by quantifying the materiality of any disclosed
facts? 5 6
Under an exclusively quantitative standard, the SEC will have to
prove that information released in violation of Regulation FD was material because of its actual or potential effect on the market price of
the corporation's securities.5 7 Where such a violation did in fact impact the market, resulting in a significant change in the level of trading, the SEC will have substantial evidence that the information was
material. 58 If the information released in violation of Regulation FD
was never traded upon, however, the SEC's case will be harder to
prove, involving the application of accounting models and hypotheti59
cal assessments of the information's potential impact on the market.

56. A comment from the Roundtable on Regulation FD reiterates this point: "You
are putting corporate America in the decision-making role of having to decide at the
time they are making a statement whether what they are saying is material. And standards for judging materiality... are very uncertain. And many lawyers will say to someone, 'If the statement is material, it is going to create a lot of problems, so don't make
it.'" David Ruder, Regulation FD Roundtable, at 53 (Apr. 24, 2001), at http://
w.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdconf.txt.
57. Proof of materiality will depend upon the various accounting approaches used
to assess the significance of a particular piece of information. In this regard, the
method of accounting itself will be a highly contentious issue. Problems of proof will
become even more obscure in ajurisdiction that embraces the 'mosaic' theory of materiality. In its Adopting Release, the SEC attempted to anticipate this problem: "[A]n
issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information to an analyst, even if unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a mosaic of
information that, taken together, is material." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
SEC-Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,722 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103). Yet, how easy is it to discern a material piece of information, standing alone, from one which, only when coupled with two or more facts in a
mosaic, suddenly becomes material? And wouldn't that non-material fact, if essential to
completing the mosaic, have a degree of materiality itself?
58. Here, a simple causal connection will be evident. The information was material because it was subsequently traded on, thus driving up or down the market price of
the corporation's shares. See also infra note 94.
59. As noted, supra note 57, enforcement of the regulation may degenerate into
litigation over the methods of accounting employed by both sides in a dispute.
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B.

Qualitative Materiality

In any determination of materiality, particularly under Regulation
FD, quantitative standards are "only the beginning."60 According to
the SEC, "there are numerous circumstances in which misstatements
below 5% could well be material." 61 The SEC believes that exclusive
reliance on a quantitative approach overlooks the totality of the "surrounding circumstances" 62 in which a fact is disclosed and this, in turn,
may create a misleading portrait of a corporation's overall managerial
and financial integrity. To this end, the SEC also advocates a qualitative approach to identifying material information, which encompasses
an assessment of the "character or conduct" 63 of corporate management, irrespective of the quantitative impact of such conduct. For example, a fact may be material to an investor ifit conceals a pattern of
"questionable or illegal activities of management" 64 or if it evinces an
intent by management to consistently overstate earnings while remaining within a quantitative margin of error with respect to its effect on
the company's financial statements. 65 Qualitative materiality embraces
illegal but quantitatively immaterial acts as well as more ambiguous
realms of conduct such as unethical or incompetent behavior by management that may be of significance to an investor in assessing the
soundness of the corporation. 66 Thus, a qualitative approach, while
not negating the importance of quantitative standards, introduces (an
integrity as an equally imporinvestor's perception of) management
67
tant element of materiality.
60. SEG Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19,
1999).
61. Id. at 45,152 n. 12.
62. Id. at 45,151 (quoting FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 123-24 (1980)).
63. John Fedders, QualitativeMateriality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 41 (2000). Fedders comments: "In the 1970s, a
qualitative standard of materiality was introduced by the [SEC] ...The standard employed no definable benchmarks. The measurement was by quality, kind, and essential
character or conduct. The SEC viewed unadjudicated violations of law, or even antisocial or unethical conduct, as possible grounds for disclosure regardless of size or impact
on business because corporate officials were willing to engage in such conduct." Id.
64. Id. at 75 (quoting from a speech by SEC Commissioner Evans, June 1982).
65. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 19,
1999).
66. Fedders, supra notes 63-64.
67. A purely qualitative approach to materiality is understood only in terms of
how management conduct would affect an investor's perception of managerial integ-
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This approach has been widely criticized as an extremely broad
and unworkable standard that injects an element of subjectivity (the
SEC's) into what otherwise has been an objective assessment of the
materiality of a given piece of information. 68 Naturally, there is no
uniform set of standards as to what constitutes qualitatively significant
conduct, outside of the most egregious, self-dealing, illegal behavior by
management. 69 Under this approach, will the SEC thus become the
sole interpreter as to what an investor believes is qualitatively material
with regard to management behavior? Will issuers be left to anticipate
how the SEC will decide qualitative materiality on a case by case basis?
Under an exclusively qualitative standard, the SEC will have to
prove that information disclosed in violation of Regulation FD was material because it either revealed illegal conduct by corporate officers or
conduct that is indicative of a fundamental lack of managerial integrity, either of which an investor would consider important in making
an informed investment decision. 70 This approach is by nature context-specific, involving assessments of what a reasonable investor would
consider important with regard to the competency and integrity of corporate management. 71 The contours of such an approach are broad
and will ultimately have to "take into account all the considerations
72
that enter into an experienced human judgment."

rity. This framework uses subjective criteria yet is based upon an objective "reasonable
investor" standard.
68. The SEC's inclusion of a qualitative materiality standard in Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99 has, according to some panelists at the Roundtable, only made materialityjudgments under Regulation FD that much more difficult. Commissioner Laura S.
Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, (Dec. 2001) at http://
iw.sec.gov/ news/studies/regfdstudy.htm. See generally Fedders; Honvich, supra note
38; Ehrenberg and Friedman, supra note 43.
69. The SEC has previously admitted to the difficulty inherent in attempting to
establish qualitatively significant standards of conduct. See infra text accompanying
note 123.
70. Under current law, qualitative materiality must be understood in terms of its
impact upon the deliberations of the reasonable investor. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See infra Part II.C. See also supra notes 63, 67.
71.
In particular, the necessity of a fact-specific nature of any investigation into
materiality was explained in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See infra Part
II.C.
72. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19,
1999) (quoting FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 131 (1980)).
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C.

The JudicialStandard

The current framework for analyzing materiality under federal securities laws was posited by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries,Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,73 a case involving federal proxy fraud under §14(a) of
the Exchange Act, and has since been widely adopted by courts in
other areas of the securities laws. 74 Under the TSC standard, "an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 75
This standard contemplates that the fact "would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder... and
would have been viewed ... as having altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 76 The Court went on to fine tune this analytical framework and suggested that understanding the materiality of a
fact involves attempting to determine "the inferences a 'reasonable
shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance
of those inferences to him"; determinations which must be "peculiarly
77
ones for the trier of fact."
The TSC materiality standard was later referenced in a variety of
federal insider trading cases, most notably Chiarella v. United States,78
and Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission,79 and was "expressly
adopt[ed]" by the Supreme Court as the legal standard of liability
under §10(b), Rule lOb-5, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.80 Chiarellarelied
upon the TSC materiality standard in deciding that there can be no
criminal or civil liability under §10(b), Rule lOb-5, for failing to disclose possession of material nonpublic information before trading on
such information without a concomitant duty to disclose arising under
a fiduciary relationship or other similar agreement of confidence or
trust.8 ' Dirks further developed the Chiarella analysis by declining to
73. See 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
74. The TSC standard is utilized in virtually all federal antifraud securities litigation involving issues of materiality. See generally EP MedSystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc.,
235 F.3d 865 (3d Cir. 2000); Rodney v. KPMG Peat Manvick, 143 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir.
1998); United Paperworkers Int'l. Union v. International Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190 (2d
Cir. 1993); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 450.
78. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
79. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
80. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
81. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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impose on tippees the insider's duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic information where the information communicated by
the insider was not for the insider's personal benefit or gain and thus
could not be said to have been in violation of his or her fiduciary duties to shareholders.8 2 In the Dirks analysis, the Supreme Court stated
that determining whether or not disclosure was motivated by personal
gain will depend in large part on "whether the information will be
viewed as material nonpublic information" 83 and this inquiry into materiality inevitably led the Court to focus on the use, as opposed to the
84
simple possession, of the information disclosed.
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that the standard of materiality
posited under federal proxy laws in TSC was "expressly adopt[ed]" as
the standard to be applied in proving the materiality element of an
action under § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, of the Exchange Act. 85 The Court,
in framing the materiality issue, recognized that where an "event is
contingent or speculative in nature, it [will be] difficult to ascertain
whether the 'reasonable investor' would have considered the... information significant at the time." 86 In spite of this difficulty, the Court
87
went on to reject a bright-line rule of materiality as "easier to follow"
yet impractical in application. A determination of materiality, according to the Court in Basic, "requires the exercise ofjudgement in light
of all the circumstances" 88 and is "inherently fact-specific."8 9
Basic underscores the importance of the TSC standard of materiality in the federal securities laws and reaffirms the factual, context determinative nature of any investigation of materiality. After Basic, both
quantitative and qualitative approaches to materiality remain viable in
light of the perceptions and considerations of the "reasonable investor."90 Yet Basic declines to define the contours, with respect to materiality, of "all the considerations that enter into [the] experienced
82.
83.

See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 662.

84.

See id.

85. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 236.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. That is to say, determining whether information is material depends upon its
qualitative or quantitative significance to the "reasonable investor," not to the SEC.
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human judgement" 9 of the "reasonable investor." The guiding legal
standard for assessing the materiality of a fact thus is understood only
in terms of the fact's propensity to play a significant part in the deliberations of the "reasonable investor" in determining whether or not to
act in a certain way (to vote, to trade, to wait, etc.).92
Under the TSC standard, the SEC will have to prove that the information disclosed in violation of Regulation FD would have altered the
"'total mix"' of information made available to the reasonable investor.
More specifically, the SEC must demonstrate that there is a "substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would have considered" the
information disclosed in violation of Regulation FD important in deciding how to act.93 Where the information disclosed was subsequently

traded on, the SEC will have an easier burden of proof, since the information impelled the recipient to act.94 Thus, the evidence will demonstrate that the information disclosed had actual utility to the recipient
and fundamentally altered the "total mix" of information made available to that person to the extent that he or she acted in reliance on the
information. However, where the information disclosed in violation of
Regulation FD was never acted upon, the SEC will have a substantially
heavier burden of proof that the information was material. 95 If there
is no evidentiary support of use, the issue in such a proceeding will be
the apparent (utility) materiality of the information. 9 6 As history has
-91.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150-51 (Aug. 19, 1999)
(quoting FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 31 (1980)).
92. The Court in Basic also cites to the "probability-magnitude" test posited in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), as an alternate standard where
materiality is determined by looking to the subsequent use of the information. See 485
U.S. 238, 241 n. 18.
93. In the SEC's Staff Accounting Bulletin No.99, the FASB puts forth their own
rendition of a materiality standard, incorporating the "probability-magnitude" test of
Texas Gulf Sulphur "The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is
material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such
that it is probable that the judgement of a reasonable person relying upon the report
would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item."
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999)
(quoting from FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, at 132 (1980)).
94. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968). See also In re
Investors Mgmt. Co., 1971 WL 120502 at *7, 44 SEC 633 (1971) (citing Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the court stated, "the fact that respondents acted immediately or very shortly
after receipt of the information to effect sales and short sales of Douglas stock, is in
itself evidence of its materiality.").
95. See infra Part III.B.3.
96. See infra Part III.B.3.
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demonstrated, the apparent materiality of a fact (or omission) is "not
'97
always susceptible to a ready answer.
In part III, the preceding approaches to understanding and enforcing the materiality element in Regulation FD will be scrutinized
under the Supreme Court's void for vagueness doctrine. Following a
brief exposition of the doctrine's purpose and analytical framework,
the void for vagueness doctrine will be applied to the materiality element of Regulation FD in order to illustrate how the regulation fails to
provide fair notice of liability.

III.

THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

At its simplest, the void for vagueness doctrine is premised upon
the belief that in a democratic society a person "is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct."9 8 This freedom, however, is contingent
upon the long held constitutional principle that the "laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that he may act accordingly." 99 Towards this end, the
Supreme Court has consistently declared that "an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."1 00
Under the void for vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court has
historically sought to find certain constitutionally guaranteed due process protections embodied in the language of the law in contention. 101
First, in both the criminal and civil contexts, the law must provide fair
notice of the proscribed conduct. 10 2 This means that the conduct to
be proscribed must be sufficiently particular to allow the "person of
ordinary intelligence" reasonable opportunity to adjust or conform his
or her behavior according to the terms of the law. 103 Second, the law
"must provide explicit standards for those who apply them" and must
not "impermissibly delegate[ ] basic policy matters to policemen,
judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis," in
order to avoid arbitrary or selective enforcement. 10 4 Third, in conjunction with the vagueness doctrine, a statute regulating speech that
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra note 38.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1997).
See id.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Id.
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is otherwise sufficiently clear may still be considered "'overbroad' if in
105
its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct."
While fair notice is generally a due process safeguard against crim10 6
its tenets have also been applied, "albeit less forcefully,"
liability,
inal
where the contested regulation imposes exclusively civil penalties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that when "reviewing a business
regulation for facial vagueness... the principal inquiry is whether the
10 7
law affords fair warning of what is proscribed."
In applying the vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court tends to
distinguish between (1) laws imposing criminal penalties or laws that
may infringe upon the "exercise of constitutionally protected rights"
and (2) rules that impose civil penalties or rules that regulate specific
economic activity.' 0 8 The Court gives greater scrutiny to the former
and shows "greater tolerance" for the latter where "the consequences
of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." 10 9
Thus, in applying the void for vagueness doctrine to Regulation
FD, the first inquiry is: does the rule proscribe a constitutionally protected right, such as freedom of speech, or does it merely regulate an
economic activity? Does it impose criminal or civil penalties for the
violation of its proscription? Understanding this distinction is an important first step in anticipating how the Court would scrutinize Regulation FD under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Second, once the nature of the activity proscribed is determined,
the principal tests to be applied to Regulation FD then become: (1)
Does the Regulation provide fair warning of the proscribed activity?
(2) Does the Regulation provide "explicit standards for those who apply them," or does it "impermissibly delegate" that task to the SEC,
"judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis"?" 0
If the answer to either question is negative, and the problem cannot be
remedied through administrative interpretation, then the Regulation
is unconstitutionally vague.
105. Ia.at 114.
106. Upton v. SEG, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).
107. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503

(1982).
108. 455 U.S. at 498-99.
109. Id.
110.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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The Scope of Regulation FD

The first inquiry is to determine whether Regulation FD prohibits
a constitutionally protected right or whether it merely regulates economic activity."' 1 The SEC promulgated Regulation FD as a means of
proscribing the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information
without a simultaneous or prompt public disclosure of the same information.1 1 2 Disclosure, selective or otherwise, occurs through various
methods and channels of communication between corporate officers
and outside persons.1 13 Regulation FD prohibits the communication
of a particular kind of information ("material nonpublic") in a particular manner (via "selective disclosure") without a corresponding public
dissemination of the same information within a specified period of
1 14
time ("simultaneously" or "promptly").
Under the regulation, corporate officers are no longer able to
communicate freely with certain persons (such as brokers, dealers,
analysts, investment advisers, anyone "associated" with these individuals, and any "holder" of the issuer's securities) regarding various matters relevant to the affairs of the corporation without making public
the substance (content) of their communications through approved
channels of dissemination, such as websites, SEC disclosure, news
wires, etc., within a limited period of time.1 15 In short, the scope of
Regulation FD's speech prohibition is broad, effectively ensnaring any
communication initiated by the corporation that may reveal potentially
important yet not publicly available information. Thus, Regulation FD
regulates the manner, time, place and content of speech, albeit in a
business context, between corporate officers and a variety of outside
persons and therefore falls within the ambit of the "constitutionally

111.

See supra notes 106-09.

112. See supra Part I.
113. As generally understood, public or private disclosure can occur through both
formal and informal channels, such as face to face communication, telephone, conference calls, webcasts, press releases, news wires, or electronic transmission. Regulation
FD proscribes one manner of disclosure - that which takes place to the exclusion of all
other methods of communication - and imposes an affirmative obligation upon issuers
to disseminate selectively disclosed information in a public manner. See supra Part I text
and accompanying notes.
114. See supra Part I.
115. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(b), 243.101(e) (2002).
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protected right[ ]"116 of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech.
While such communications do not constitute commercial
speech, as the Supreme Court has described that term,1 1 7 even commercial speech enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection.11 8 In
spite of the fact that the regulation sanctions the imposition of only
civil penalties, the Supreme Court will likely lend heightened scrutiny
to the terms of the regulation under a vagueness analysis because it
"'abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment'"119 rights.

116.

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498

(1982).
117. The Supreme Court has defined, in general terms, commercial speech as either an "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" or "speech proposing a commercial transaction." Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.,
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). Justice Stevens, concurring in Central Hudson, criticized both definitions of
commercial speech as, respectively, too broad or too narrow. See CentralHudson,at 57980. It is also unclear to what extent the two definitions overlap or differ. See U.S. West,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999); Commodity
Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1998).
In U.S. West, the Tenth Circuit characterized the speech in question as "integral to and
inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation" and thus "properly categorized
as commercial speech." U.S. West at 1233. As a general matter, it may be best to understand commercial speech as speech for the purpose of advertising and solicitation, or
promoting a commercial transaction or as falling within the context of a commercial
transaction.
The type of speech proscribed by Regulation FD does not fall under either definition of commercial speech. Corporate officers and analysts are not engaged in any sort
of advertising or solicitation among themselves and the type of information sought by
analysts is not for the purpose of proposing a commercial transaction between analyst
and officer. Rather, the analyst seeks objective, hard data about a corporation's finances and operations, oftentimes to the detriment of the corporation, in order to
assess the corporation's fundamental strengths and weaknesses.
118. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
("The First Amendment... protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation."). See alsoVirginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (noting that even "purely commercial" speech falls within the protection of
the First Amendment, although such protection does not demand as greatjudicial scrutiny as other forms of speech).
119. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 45

The FairNotice Requirement

It remains to be seen (1) whether Regulation FD provides fair notice of the content of disclosure that is prohibited and (2) whether
Regulation FD provides explicit standards for corporate issuers to follow and the SEC to enforce.
1.

Fair notice and the qualitative standard of materiality

Under a qualitative standard of materiality, the Supreme Court
will likely find that Regulation FD is impermissibly vague because it
fails to provide the person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of
potential liability. As noted above, a qualitative standard looks to the
"surrounding circumstances" in which a fact is disclosed and, in particular, defines material information as that which, in addition to quantitative indicia, embraces the "character or conduct" of corporate
management. 120 This standard encompasses illegal as well as the
broad realm of unethical or incompetent behavior yet it does not define the parameters of such behavior for compliance or enforcement
purposes. 12 1 There are no uniform explicit standards of management
conduct promulgated by the SEC upon which issuers may rely in order
to conform to the requirements of a qualitative rule. 12 2 In spite of
recent attempts to clarify the boundaries of qualitative materiality, the
SEC itself has admitted in the past that since "information reflecting
on management ability and integrity is, in part, subjective, it is difficult
to articulate a meaningful, well functioning objective disclosure re3
quirement which will elicit it."l2
A qualitative standard leaves complete discretion to the SEC as the
sole interpreter of what information, if any, the "reasonable investor"
would consider qualitatively material. This can only lead to arbitrary
and selective enforcement of the regulation and will delegate the task
of fleshing out a qualitative standard to 'Judges and juries on an ad
hoc and subjective basis." 124 In fact, the courts, while recognizing that
the SEC merits "substantial deference" in the construction of its own
120. See supra Part II.B.
121. See supra Part II.B.
122. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
123. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Securities
Act Release No. 5949, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,407 (July 28, 1978)).
124. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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regulations, 125 have rejected qualitative materiality as an indefinable
and unworkable standard upon which to base liability.' 26 By injecting
a subjective element into what has otherwise been an objective determination, qualitative materiality will reduce compliance with the regulation to a guessing game as to when the SEC will act to enforce
perceived violations. Thus, as the Second Circuit has stated, "there is
limited guidance for issuers or practitioners for resolving materiality
27
and disclosure problems."
Under a qualitative standard, then, the regulation will place the
sole burden upon issuers to anticipate what exactly it prohibits and to
decide how best to comply with its terms yet will not limit the enforcement discretion of the SEC. Nevertheless, as John Fedders states,
"[t]hose decisions cannot be made simply by employing arithmetic.
Reasonable people will differ in their views as to whether qualitative
information is material." 128 The ambiguity that will inevitably accompany imposition of a qualitative standard under Regulation FD will
compel issuers to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ...than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.' "129 As a consequence, the free exchange of information between issuers and analysts that is essential to an accurate, efficient, and open market will be
impeded as issuers grapple with the restrictions on the content of their
communications.1 3 0
125. Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939
(1986)).
126. See Fedders, supra note 63, at 61-65; see also Matthews, 787 F.2d at 48.
127. Matthews, 787 F.2d at 48.
128. Fedders, supra note 63, at 44.
129. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). Cf.City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999)
(in holding a city anti-loitering law unconstitutionally vague, the Court stated "the
vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the normal meaning of 'loitering' but rather about what loitering is covered by the ordinance
and what is not."). Opinions expressed at the SEC Roundtable echo this concern:
"there is one common theme here, and that is how many data points represent something significant. And with [Regulation] FD basically what has happened is you are less
comfortable in a free and open discussion about the first data point because you don't
know for sure does that lead to three and four [and] now we have a new trend we need
to talk about." Kipp Bedard, Regulation FD Roundtable, at 45 (Apr. 24, 2001), at http://
www.sec. gov/news/studies/regfdconf.txt. "It is a very difficult decision to determine
what is material, it is very difficult to know have you reached the actual level of dissemination that is required by [Regulation] FD." Id. at 70.
130. The fear that such an ambiguous materiality requirement would obstruct
rather than facilitate the free-flow of information from the market has been a signifi-
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Fair notice and the deliberations of the "reasonable
investor"

Under the objective "reasonable investor" standard of materiality
posited in TSC and later reaffirmed in Basic, the Supreme Court will
most likely find that Regulation FD fails to provide fair notice of liability for the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information. The
TSC standard originates in "the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder" and the question of whether he or she would have viewed the
fact "as having altered the 'total mix' of information made available."' 31 This essentially factual inquiry, incorporating elements of
both quantitative and qualitative materiality judgments, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, is insufficient to establish liability under
Regulation FD for two reasons discussed below.
First, under insider trading law, liability arises from the breach of a
duty in the transmission of material nonpublic information and the use
of such information for personal benefit or gain.1 32 It follows, in an
insider trading context, that disclosed information that is not used or
that does not produce personal benefit is most likely not material.
This approach to establishing materiality is highly dependent upon a
finding of the actual use of information or, in the alternative, of a mo33
tive or intent to disclose information for use or personal benefit.'
Neither finding is relevant for the purposes of Regulation FD, where
liability arises from the disclosure itself of material information regardless of intent or of its actual utilization. 134 Only the potential or apparcant criticism of Regulation FD from the start. See Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street
Feels Effect of 'FairDisclosure' Rule, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Cl; Cheryl Munk, SEC
DisclosureRule Dims Appeal of Conferences, WALL ST.J., Feb. 27, 2001, at C16. See also John
J. Egan III, Full Disclosure Apt to Backfire, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2000, at C4;
Mitchell Zacks, FullDisclosureMay Hurt the Overall Marketplace, CHICAGO Su-TimEs, Aug.
13, 2000, at 51.
131.
See supra Part II.C.
132. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see also supra Part II.C.
133.
See supra note 94.
134. The SEC states: "The approach we propose does not treat selective disclosure
as a type of fraudulent conduct or revisit the insider trading issues addressed in Dirks.
Rather, we propose to use our authority to require full and fair disclosure from issuers
. . .This Regulation is designed as an issuer disclosure rule . . ." Proposed Rule at
72,594. Yet, as David Ruder stated at the Roundtable on Regulation FD, "the problem
that [the SEC] need[s] to address is whether or not there is some way to address the
threshold of materiality for the purposes of this rule that is different than standards in a
fraud case." David Ruder, Regulation FD Roundtable, at 53 (Apr. 24, 2001) at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdconf.txt.
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ent utility (materiality) of the information is at issue, which, as
discussed below, is not an adequate standard of proof upon which to
establish liability for selective disclosure.
Second, under insider trading law, the nature of this "fact-specific"
inquiry is acceptable because it is only one of many elements to be
proven in arriving at a determination of liability for fraud. 135 Proof of
fraud and deceit are the overriding concerns in the federal antifraud
securities laws and there are clear rules for what constitutes securities
or proxy fraud.' 36 The definition of fraud under the rules does not
have to be determined on a case by case basis; it is only the rule as it is
applied to the facts that is normally at issue in any proceeding brought
under insider trading law. Yet in any enforcement proceeding
brought under Regulation FD,the contours of the materiality prohibition (the regulation itself) will be on trial and the only guiding standard of what the regulation is, and, therefore, how the outcome should
be determined by the trier of fact, will lie in the apparentutility of the
information to the "reasonable investor." The SEC - which is not
bound to follow its own precedent - will have the discretion to argue
multiple and perhaps conflicting standards of materiality. Consequently, the task of defining the requirement of the regulation will fall
to the trier of fact, and the regulation will thus have as many permutations as the "reasonable investor" can conceive. Where every enforcement proceeding puts the element and definition of materiality itself
on trial, the person of "ordinary intelligence" cannot be said to have
fair notice of what constitutes material information.
3.

Fair notice and the quantitative standard of materiality

Under a quantitative standard of materiality, the Supreme Court
will likely find that Regulation FD does not provide fair notice of liability. This is a closer call than the previous standards because quantitative materiality provides the next best thing to a bright line materiality
test. While it may not purport to define all material information, its
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
136. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("Section 10(b) [15
USCA 78j(h)] is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud."); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) ("The [proxy]
Rule's broad remedial purpose... is not merely to ensure by judicial means that the
transaction ...is fair and otherwise adequate, but to ensure disclosures by corporate
management in order to enable the shareholder to make an informed choice."). See
also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9.
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more structured accounting approach to quantifying the impact of a
fact on the market is more reliable for issuers trying to comply with the
requirements of the regulation. 137 As Justice Marshall has stated,
"[c] ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical
certainty from our language."' 38 Under a quantitative approach, at
the very least, it is not necessary to expect such certainty from language
alone. Bring in the accountants. In terms of both enforcing and complying with the regulation, an exclusively quantitative analysis can provide a greater degree of predictability and certainty to materiality
assessments. However, its inherent limitations also render quantitative
analysis susceptible to the criticism of vagueness. While it provides
greater predictability, it is still based upon accounting standards that
can do no more than anticipate the market's reaction to information.
If proving materiality is to be the key to liability, standards of proof
must be based upon more than possibilities and predictions.' 3 9 A related problem is that of identifying uniform accounting standards
across a multitude of industries for the plethora of information that
can be subject to quantitative analysis. Varying standards and formulas
for quantitative analysis make this approach difficult for compliance
purposes and equally susceptible to arbitrary enforcement.1 40 The
lack of uniformity and the complexity of formulating such standards
for measuring the effect of all potentially misspoken facts renders this
approach cumbersome and greatly diminishes the possibility that issuers will have fair notice of what type of information will be deemed
material under Regulation FD.
CONCLUSION

As framed, Regulation FD is inherently vague because it does not
allow corporate issuers to identify with reasonable certainty the boundaries between lawful and unlawful conduct in disclosing material nonpublic information. Rather than "narrowing the field of uncertainty"
137. Quantitative materiality's reliability stems from its objective, fact-specific nature, measuring whether a misstated fact or omission will "significantly affect a company's financial performance and, its stock price." Fedders, supra note 63, at 46.
138. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
139. See supra Part II.A. Indeed, the SEC in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 further states with regard to quantitative materiality that "exclusive reliance on this [a 5%
quantitative threshold] or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the
accounting literature or the law." SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg.
45,150-51 (Aug. 19, 1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 45-56.
140.
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by providing explicit standards for determining what constitutes material information for both compliance and enforcement purposes, Regulation FD enlarges the scope of uncertainty by rendering virtually all
selectively disclosed information susceptible to a determination of materiality. The effect of this is to hinder the free exchange of information between corporations, analysts and investors as corporate issuers
reduce or cut off communication altogether rather than risk violating
14 1
the rule.
Nicholas Kappas

141. In her report, Commissioner Unger concludes that the SEC "itself must speak
more clearly about the types of information the regulation seeks to make public. Once
the [SEC] makes its views on materiality clearer, issuers may feel more comfortable
engaging in dialogue with industry professionals about non-material information. This
dialogue will allow analysts to bring more nuanced information to the marketplace."
Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation FairDisclosure Revisited, (Dec.
2001) at http:// www.sec.gov/news/studies/ regfdstudy.htm.

